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Inviting an Impermissible Inquiry?
RFRA’s Substantial-Burden
Requirement and “Centrality”
Abstract
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) prohibits the federal government from
substantially burdening a person’s religious exercise unless the government can satisfy strict
scrutiny. The statute also defines religious exercise to prohibit courts from inquiring into how
central a particular religious exercise is to a person’s religion. “The term ‘religious exercise,’”
reads the relevant provision, “includes any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or
central to, a system of religious belief.”
Despite this prohibition on centrality inquiries, some scholars argue that RFRA’s
substantial-burden element requires courts to consider the religious costs a law imposes on a
religious adherent who chooses to comply with the law. This Note argues that approach is wrong.
Considering the religious costs a law imposes in turn requires courts to consider the place or
importance of a particular religious exercise in a person’s religion—i.e., whether it is compelled
by, or central to, the person’s religion. But since 2000, RFRA has defined religious exercise to
preclude such inquiries.
So how should a court conduct a substantial-burden analysis? By focusing on the secular
costs (e.g., the magnitude of civil penalties) a law imposes on a religious adherent who refuses to
comply with the law for religious reasons. This Note surveys four categories of substantial secular
burdens under RFRA. It also restates RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement. But the main
purpose of the Note is to stress what should be clear from RFRA’s text: that considering how
central a religious exercise is to a person’s religion is impermissible.
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Inviting an Impermissible Inquiry?
RFRA’s Substantial-Burden Requirement and “Centrality”
D. Bowie Duncan*
“What principle of law or logic can be brought to bear to contradict a believer’s assertion that a
particular act is ‘central’ to his personal faith?”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Not all burdens on religious exercise are equal. So says Congress, at least. The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) provides protection only when the government substantially
burdens a person’s religious exercise. 2

A mere burden is not enough to trigger RFRA’s

protections.3 But where is the line between a mere burden and a substantial one? And given that
courts must avoid inquiring into the centrality of a religious practice to a person’s religion, how,
exactly, are they to determine whether a law substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise?
The second question is the focus of this Note. In Employment Division v. Smith, Justice
Scalia argued that judges should avoid asking whether a religious act is central to a person’s
religion.4 Many cases before Smith recognized that such an inquiry is impermissible. 5 RFRA has
since adopted this principle, defining religious exercise to include “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”6 And yet some argue that

*

J.D. Candidate, 2022, University of Texas School of Law; B.A., 2019, University of Virginia. All errors
are my own.
1

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).

2

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).

3

Id.

4

494 U.S. at 887.

5

See infra note 46 and accompanying text.

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added); see also id. § 2000bb-2(4) (incorporating RLUIPA’s
definition of religious exercise).
6

3

RFRA requires judges to consider the religious costs (the threat to salvation, for instance) of
complying with a law when determining whether a burden on religious exercise is substantial. 7
This Note argues that approach is wrong. It is impossible to consider whether complying
with a law would impose religious costs without considering whether a particular religious exercise
is compelled by, or central to, a person’s religion. But doing so would be contrary to RFRA’s text
and the Court’s long-standing prohibition on centrality inquiries.8 So what does that leave of the
substantial-burden inquiry? All that remains is the question of the secular costs (civil or criminal
penalties, for instance) a law imposes on someone who disobeys the law for religious reasons.
This Note’s discussion proceeds in two parts. Part II offers background on the Free
Exercise Clause and RFRA. It introduces the “prohibition” on judges inquiring into the centrality
of religious practice to a person’s religion, as well as RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement. 9
Part III analyzes several proposed approaches to the substantial-burden inquiry RFRA requires. 10
Some of these approaches (those that focus on religious costs) incorporate a centrality inquiry, or
something like it, into the substantial-burden inquiry.11 Others attempt to avoid the centrality
inquiry by focusing on the secular burden the challenged law imposes. 12 Part III ends with a
proposal for how courts should conduct a substantial-burden analysis.13 The Note concludes with

7

See infra subpart III.A.

8

See infra note 135 and accompanying text.

9

See infra Part II.

See infra Part II. For simplicity’s sake, this Note focuses on RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement,
though, where useful, it also analyzes to the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA), which has an identical requirement.
10

11

See infra subpart II.A.

12

See infra subpart III.B.

13

See infra subpart III.C.
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thoughts on how likely courts and religious-liberty lawyers are to stop considering the centrality
of beliefs or practices to a person’s religion (in short, not very).
II. BACKGROUND: THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE AND RFRA
The Free Exercise Clause bars Congress from making any law “prohibiting the free
exercise [of religion].”14 The Clause protects religious beliefs and religious practices, too. But it
does not protect religious practices absolutely—nor could it, “in the nature of things.”15 The
Supreme Court had to operationalize the Clause’s protection for a society that could not help but
incidentally burden religion. It did so, in time, by applying strict scrutiny to laws that burden
individuals’ free exercise rights, even if incidentally. 16 Thus, the Supreme Court held in Sherbert
v. Verner 17 that the government may not incidentally burden religious exercise unless it has a
compelling government interest to do so. 18
But the Court’s decision nearly three decades later in Employment Division v. Smith
departed from Sherbert and limited the circumstances in which strict scrutiny applies.19 Indeed, it
protected a whole category of laws from Free Exercise challenges, even though those laws might
burden, or even substantially burden, religious practices. 20 The Court held that neutral laws of
general applicability do not violate the First Amendment, even if they incidentally burden religious

14

U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Court incorporated the Free Exercise Clause against the states in Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
15

Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303–04.

See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (applying strict scrutiny to a state’s decision to
refuse unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who would not work on Saturdays).
16

17

Id.

18

Id. at 403, 406.

19

494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).

20

Id. at 883.

5

exercise.21 Thus, in Smith, the Court concluded that Oregon’s law prohibiting peyote (a law that
applied with equal force to all Oregonians) was constitutional under the Free Exercise Clause.22
The plaintiffs below, members of the Native American Church, could therefore be denied
unemployment benefits for having used peyote.23
Congress responded to Smith, and restored Sherbert, by enacting RFRA. RFRA provides
protection whenever a law substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise, even if the law is
neutral and generally applicable.24 RFRA originally applied to the federal government and the
states. But a few years after Congress enacted RFRA, the Court, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 25
struck down the part that applied to states. Congress responded to this ruling by enacting the
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), again extending, in a limited
form, the blessing of religious liberty to the states. 26
As we will see, Congress adopted RFRA and RLUIPA against a backdrop of other
doctrines guiding courts’ conduct in religious liberty cases. One of those doctrines forbids courts
from inquiring into how central a belief or practice is to a person’s religious belief system. 27
Drawing on this doctrine, RLUIPA defines religious exercise to preclude courts from inquiring

21

Id. at 878–85.

22

Id. at 890.

23

Id.

24

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).

25

521 U.S. 507 (1997).

26

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc(a)(1).

27

See infra subpart II.A.
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into the centrality of a religious practice to a person’s religion. 28 RFRA has incorporated this
definition, too.29
The remainder of this Part considers the origins and nature of the prohibition on centrality
inquiries. It then considers the origins and nature of RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement. It
ends by offering a brief interpretation of RFRA’s text, focusing on the meaning of “substantially
burden” and “religious exercise.”30
A.

Centrality
In most religions, some practices and beliefs are more central than others.31 And we might

be more concerned about the government inhibiting religious adherents from engaging in central
(or required) religious acts than merely peripheral (or recommended) ones. In the same way, we
might be more concerned about the government requiring or encouraging adherents to engage in
forbidden acts than merely discouraged ones.
But the Supreme Court has routinely recognized that courts should not inquire into the
centrality of religious practices to a person’s religion. This principle has its roots in the Court’s
decisions concerning church property disputes. In Watson v. Jones32 and Kedroff v. St. Nicholas
Cathedral,33 the Court refused to independently decide who among the litigating factions

28

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).

29

Id. § 2000bb-1(a).

30

See infra subpart II.B.

31

See John H. Garvey, Free Exercise and the Values of Religious Liberty, 18 CONN. L. REV. 779, 785
(1986) (“Belief or conduct may be commanded, recommended, rewarded, encouraged, desired, permitted,
discouraged, forbidden, or punished within a claimant’s belief system.”); see also Pope John XXIII, Ad
Petri Cathedram (June 29, 1959), https://www.vatican.va/content/johnxxiii/en/encyclicals/documents/hf_j-xxiii_enc_29061959_ad-petri.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2021) (calling
for resolution of religious controversies in the Catholic Church by applying the following principle: “in
essentials, unity; in doubtful matters, liberty; in all things, charity”).
32

80 U.S. 679 (1871).

33

344 U.S. 94 (1952).
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represented the “true” church and was therefore entitled to use the church property.34 It adopted a
rule to avoid deciding questions of internal church governance. Under this rule, how a court is to
proceed depends on whether the church is hierarchical, like the Catholic Church, or
congregational, like many evangelical churches. 35 When the church is hierarchical, courts should
defer to the decision of the denomination’s highest ecclesiastical authority on who owns the church
property.36 When the church is congregational, courts should apply the laws governing voluntary
associations to determine who owns the property. 37
This line of cases ultimately led the Court to adopt a rule against inquiring into the
centrality of religious practices to a person’s religion.38 As with church-property disputes, in
determining whether a belief or practice is central to a person’s religion, courts run the risk of
deciding theological matters they are not well-suited to decide.39 This is what led Justice Scalia,
writing for the majority in Smith, to reject the contention that judges should weigh the centrality
of a belief when inquiring whether a statute violates the Free Exercise Clause. Quoting Hernandez
v. Commissioner,40 he wrote that “[i]t is not within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’ interpretations of
those creeds.”41 Justice Scalia found support for this principle—that Courts “must not presume to

34

Watson, 80 U.S. at 728–29, 734; Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116, 120–21.

35

See Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 110 (establishing a judicial definition of hierarchical congregations).

36

Watson, 80 U.S. at 727; see also Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 113–16.

37

Watson, 80 U.S. at 725.

38

Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990).

39

Id.

40

490 U.S. 680 (1989).

41

Smith, 494 U.S. at 872 (quoting Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 699).
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determine the place of a particular belief in a religion”—in a number of the Court’s religious liberty
precedents, including those on church-property disputes.42
This principle has leaked into the modern religious liberty statutes. RLUIPA, adopted after
RFRA, defines “religious exercise” broadly to preclude a centrality inquiry. “The term ‘religious
exercise,’” reads the relevant provision, “includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”43 RLUIPA also amended RFRA’s
definition of “religious exercise.” Before 2000, RFRA defined religious exercise to mean “the
exercise of religion under the First Amendment to the Constitution”;44 since then, however, RFRA
has incorporated RLUIPA’s definition of religious exercise.45 Thus, religious exercise under
RFRA, too, means “any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system
of religious belief.”46
The rule against centrality inquiries reflected in RFRA, RLUIPA, and Supreme Court
precedent is sensible. Judges are lawyers, not theologians. Their judgment on whether a practice
is central to a religion is likely to be flawed. 47 This is especially true for religions outside the
mainstream. A Catholic or Protestant judge’s understanding of a Hare Krishna’s beliefs—and

42

Id. at 887 (citing Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec’y Div., 450 U.S. 707, 716 (1981); Presbyterian
Church in U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969); Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602–06 (1979); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 85–87 (1944)).
43

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added).

44

Id. § 2000bb-2(4) (amended 2000).

Id. (current version) (“[T]he term ‘exercise of religion’ means religious exercise, as defined in section
2000cc-5 of this title.”). Several mini-RFRAs recommend against judges conducting centrality inquiries.
See, e.g., TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001 (West 2019).
45

46

See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 573 U.S. 682, 695–96 (2014) (surveying the 2000
amendments, which were central to the Court’s holding that privately held for-profit corporations were
“persons” under RFRA).
See, e.g., Smith, 494 U.S. at 887 (“Repeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that
courts must not presume to determine the place of a particular belief in a religion or the plausibility of a
religious claim.”).
47

9

whether certain beliefs or practices are more important to a Hare Krishna than others—is sure to
be limited. More than that, though, when a court conducts a centrality inquiry, it risks “entangling
church and state,” raising Establishment Clause concerns.48
RFRA’s text is clear, and its current definition of religious exercise is sweeping. The
statute protects any exercise of religion regardless of whether the particular exercise is central to
(or compelled by) a religious adherent’s system of beliefs.49 But where does that leave RFRA’s
still-undefined substantial-burden requirement? If judges are to avoid inquiring into centrality,
can they nonetheless inquire into the religious (as opposed to secular) costs a law imposes?
B.

Substantiality
RFRA prohibits the federal government from “substantially burden[ing] a person’s

exercise of religion, even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” unless the rule
furthers “a compelling government interest” and “is the least restrictive means of furthering that
interest.”50 RLUIPA speaks in the same terms. The statute prohibits state governments from
imposing land-use regulations that “substantial[ly] burden” a person’s religious exercise.51 It also
prohibits state governments from substantially burdening a prisoner’s religious exercise.52 Many
states have adopted “mini-RFRAs,” too.53 These statutes (or constitutional provisions) mimic the
federal RFRA’s protections at the state level. And like the federal RFRA, they typically prohibit

48

Marc O. DeGirolami, Substantial Burdens Imply Central Beliefs, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 19, 19.

49

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).

50

Id. § 2000bb-1.

51

Id. § 2000cc.

52

Id. § 2000cc-1.

53

See State Religious Freedom Acts, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS,
https://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx (last visited Oct. 30,
2021) (listing twenty-one states as having enacted mini-RFRA statutes since the Court decided Boerne).
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“substantial” burdens on religious exercise.54 Some states, however, have omitted the requirement
that the burden be “substantial.”55 What work does the word do, anyhow?
Congress, at least, added “substantial” to modify “burden” in RFRA “in an apparent effort
to avoid the floodgates problem of subjecting all incidental burdens on religion to strict scrutiny.” 56
But it gave no guidance on what courts are supposed to do when conducting a substantial burden
inquiry.57 Indeed, it left substantial burden undefined.58
To be fair, though, Congress did not come up with the substantial-burden requirement on
its own. The requirement has origins in the Supreme Court’s pre-Smith cases. As the Court wrote
in Wisconsin v. Yoder,59 “A regulation neutral on its face may, in its application, nonetheless offend
the

constitutional

requirement

for

governmental

neutrality

if

it

unduly burdens the free exercise of religion.”60 That principle, in part, led the Court to hold that
Wisconsin could not compel Amish students to attend secondary school until age sixteen. 61

E.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5233 (2020) (“Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise
of religion . . . .”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.003 (2021) (“[A] government agency may
not substantially burden a person’s free exercise of religion.”).
54

E.g., ALA. CONST. amend. 622, § 5 (West 2020) (“Government shall not burden a person’s freedom of
religion . . . .”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-571b(a) (West 2021) (“The state or any political
subdivision of the state shall not burden a person’s exercise of religion . . . .”); see also, e.g., 42 R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 42-80.1-3(a) (2014) (“[A] governmental authority may not restrict a person’s free exercise of
religion.”).
55

56

Michael C. Dorf, Incidental Burdens on Fundamental Rights, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1175, 1212–13
(1996); see also Frederick Mark Gedicks, “Substantial” Burdens: How Courts May (and Why They Must)
Judge Burdens on Religion Under RFRA, 85 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 120, 121 (2017) (arguing that the
Senate added “substantially” to modify “burden” in the Senate RFRA bill to “preclude RFRA claims for
less weighty religious costs”).
57

Dorf, supra note 56, at 1213.

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (defining terms such as “exercise of religion” and “covered entity” but not
substantial burden).
58

59

406 U.S. 205 (1972).

60

Id. at 220 (emphasis added).

61

Id. at 234.
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Along the way, the Yoder Court wrote that “Old Order Amish communities,” like the one
to which the respondents belonged, believed that “salvation requires life in a church community
separate and apart from the world and worldly influence.”62 And that belief was “central to their
faith.”63 Failing to adhere to this central belief would thus have imposed significant religious costs
on the parents (and their children). But violating Wisconsin’s compulsory-attendance statute also
carried criminal—that is, secular—penalties.64 The respondents had been convicted and fined $5,
the minimum under a statute with a maximum penalty of a fine of $50 and three months’
imprisonment.65 Though the Yoder Court ultimately concluded that the compulsory-education
statute imposed an undue burden on the Amish respondents’ religious exercise, it did not analyze
in detail what, exactly, made the burden undue. Was it the ($5) criminal penalty? Or did the
centrality of the religious belief concerning education to the Amish faith have some bearing on the
Court’s decision?
Sherbert v. Verner,66 an earlier case ushering in the later-rejected strict-scrutiny approach,
spoke mostly of “burdens” simpliciter.67 The Sherbert Court framed the question before it as
whether denying unemployment benefits to a Seventh-day Adventist who refused to work on

62

Id. at 210.

Id. (“Amish objection to formal education beyond the eighth grade is firmly grounded in these central
religious concepts.”).
63

64

Id. at 207 n.2 (quoting the relevant parts of the Wisconsin compulsory attendance statute).

65

Id. at 208 & n.3.

66

374 U.S. 398 (1963).

Id. at 403 (“We turn first to the question whether the disqualification for benefits imposes any burden
on the free exercise of appellant's religion.”).
67

12

Saturday “impose[d] any burden on the free exercise of appellant’s religion.”68 It answered in the
affirmative.69
For Seventh-day Adventists like Ms. Sherbert, Saturday is the Sabbath. Because Sherbert
refused to work on the Sabbath, she was fired from one job and could not find another.70 Unable
to find work, she filed an unemployment-benefits claim.71 But South Carolina denied her claim.72
The state deemed Sherbert ineligible for benefits under its Unemployment Compensation Act
because she was able to work but would not accept work when offered.73 Her refusal to work on
Saturday was not “good cause” to refuse available work, the South Carolina unemployment agency
concluded, a decision South Carolina courts upheld.74
To analyze the burden South Carolina imposed on Sherbert in denying her benefits, the
Court imported the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine from its Free Speech cases.75 The Court
acknowledged that the Unemployment Act’s eligibility provisions only indirectly burdened

68

Id.

69

Id. (“We think it is clear that it does.”).

70

Id. at 399.

71

Id. at 399–400.

72

Id. at 401.

73

Id.

74

Id. at 400–01.

75

For an explanation of the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine, see, for example, Edward J. Fuhr, The
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions and the First Amendment, 39 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 97 (1989).
Fuhr writes:
One version of the doctrine states that the government may never grant a privilege subject
to the condition that the recipient not exercise a constitutional right. Placing such pressure
upon constitutional rights is absolutely prohibited under this version of the doctrine. The
other version of the doctrine states that the government may only condition a government
benefit on an individual's abstention from exercising a constitutional right when “the state
presents compelling state interests” for doing so.
Id. at 100 (footnotes omitted). The Sherbert Court applied the second version of the doctrine.
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403–06 (applying this test to Sherbert’s claims).

13

Sherbert’s religious exercise. 76 Sherbert was, the Court admitted, not subject to criminal sanctions
for failing to work on Saturday.77 But the effect of the eligibility provisions was the same. Those
provisions unmistakably “pressur[ed]” her “to forego the practice” of observing the Sabbath.78
Sherbert was left with a choice: either observe the Sabbath and forfeit unemployment benefits or
abandon observing the Sabbath and start working.79 And putting Sherbert to this choice between
her livelihood and her religion burdened her religious exercise.
The Sherbert Court then applied strict scrutiny to decide whether the South Carolina
Unemployment Act’s eligibility provisions were constitutional as applied to Sherbert.80 Though
earlier in the opinion the Court spoke of mere burdens, when it reached the stage of considering
whether the government had a compelling government interest, the Court asked “whether some
compelling state interest enforced in the eligibility provisions of the South Carolina statute justifies
the substantial infringement of [Sherbert’s] First Amendment right.”81 It ultimately answered no,
meaning the statute was unconstitutional as applied to Sherbert.82

But the “substantial

infringement” phrasing laid the foundation for future cases in which the Court stated that the Free

76

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.

77

Id.

78

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404. A similar case decided over two decades after Sherbert described Sherbert’s
pressure test this way:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a
religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his
behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion
may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless substantial.
Thomas v. Rev. Bd. of Ind. Emp. Sec’y Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981).
79

Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.

80

Id. at 409.

81

Id. at 406.

82

Id. at 409.
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Exercise Clause prohibited the government from substantially burdening religious exercise
without a compelling government interest.
Take for example Hernandez v. Commissioner,83 decided a year before Smith. The
Hernandez Court framed its inquiry as “whether government has placed a substantial burden on
the observation of a central religious belief or practice and, if so, whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies the burden.”84

In Hernandez, members of the Church of

Scientology argued that not being able to deduct payments for audit and training sessions as
charitable contributions violated their Free Exercise rights.85 The Court disagreed.86
Unfortunately, though, the Court did not conclusively decide whether the tax laws
substantially burdened the Scientologists’ religious exercise.87 Instead, it decided the case on the
grounds that Congress had a compelling “interest in maintaining a sound tax system.”88 Yet the
Court wrote in passing that it had “doubts whether the alleged burden imposed by the deduction
disallowance on the Scientologists’ practices [was] a substantial one.” 89 The burden was not
unique. Like any tax or fee, it reduced the amount of money a Scientologist would have at his
disposal to pay for the auditing and training sessions.90 And the financial burden imposed by not

83

490 U.S. 680 (1989).

84

Id. at 699. For more cases articulating some form of Free Exercise burden requirement, see Emp. Div.,
Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 894–95 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (collecting
cases).
85

Hernandez, 490 U.S. at 698.

86

Id. at 684.

87

Id. at 699.

88

Id. at 700 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260 (1982)).

89

Id. at 699.

90

Id. at 688.

15

being allowed to deduct these particular payments “would seem to pale by comparison to the
overall federal income tax burden on an adherent.” 91
One other pre-Smith case is worth mentioning before proceeding: Lyng v. Northwestern
Indian Cemetery Protective Association,92 in which the Court concluded the government did not
substantially burden the plaintiffs’ religious exercise.93 Lyng concerned the U.S. Forest Service’s
decision to build a road through (and harvest timber in) part of a National Forest a group of
American Indians used for religious purposes. A commissioned study concluded that constructing
the road “would cause serious and irreparable damage to the sacred areas which are an integral
and necessary part of the [American Indians’] belief systems.”94 The Forest Service decided to
proceed nonetheless.95
Upset, a number of plaintiffs (including American Indians and organizations representing
them) sued, arguing that the Forest Service’s proposed actions violated their Free Exercise rights.
But, though the Court recognized that these actions would “have severe adverse effects on the
practice of [the American Indians’] religion,” it concluded that the burden the actions imposed was
not heavy enough to trigger strict scrutiny. 96 The Court explained that allowing the Forest Service
to proceed with construction followed from Bowen v. Roy.97 In Bowen, the Court rejected a Free
Exercise challenge to a statute requiring welfare recipients to provide the Social Security numbers

91

Id.

92

485 U.S. 439.

93

Id. at 441–42.

94

Id. at 442

95

Id. at 443.

96

Id. at 447.

97

476 U.S. 693 (1986).

16

of all family members to receive benefits. 98 Roy, an American Indian, argued that obtaining a
Social Security number for his daughter would rob her spirit and hinder her spiritual
development.99 Concluding that Roy could not prevail on his Free Exercise challenge to the
government’s Social Security number requirement, the Bowen Court wrote: “The Free Exercise
Clause affords an individual protection from certain forms of governmental compulsion; it does
not afford an individual a right to dictate the conduct of the Government’s internal procedures.” 100
The same principle controlled in Lyng. In Lyng, as in Roy, the government’s actions would
interfere with the American Indians’ ability to pursue their spiritual development. Yet the
governmental action at issue—building a road and harvesting timber—would not coerce the
Indians “into violating their religious beliefs; nor would [it] penalize religious activity by denying
any person an equal share of the rights, benefits, and privileges enjoyed by other citizens.” 101 The
Forest Service’s decision thus withstood the plaintiffs’ Free Exercise challenge.
So we see that RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement originated in the Court’s pre-Smith
case law. A good deal of doctrine developed around the requirement. This doctrine informs how
courts apply RFRA’s requirement today. But RFRA not only codified the substantial-burden
requirement in the Supreme Court’s precedents; it codified the prohibition on centrality inquiries,
too.102 The rest of this Note seeks to reconcile those two codifications. It begins by interpreting
two key elements of RFRA.
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Id. at 712.
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Id. at 700.
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To the extent the prohibition is based on Establishment Clause concerns (which Congress could not
unilaterally override), the codification may have been unnecessary. But see infra notes 146–51 and
accompanying text.
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C.

Interpreting RFRA’s Text: Substantial Burden on Religious Exercise
RFRA provides that “[g]overnment shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of

religion . . . .”103 This subpart briefly interprets “substantially burden,” then revisits Congress’s
definition “exercise of religion.” It ends by restating the substantial-burden requirement.
1. Substantially Burden
Congress failed to define “substantially burden” in RFRA, so we will have to arrive at a
definition ourselves. Merriam-Webster’s defines “burden” as “something that is carried: load,” 104
while Black’s Law Dictionary defines it as “[s]omething that hinders or oppresses.”105 And
“substantially” means “to a great or significant extent.” 106 So, it seems, a burden makes doing
something (or avoiding doing something) more difficult, as does carrying a load. And the modifier
“substantially” requires a heightened, i.e., significant, degree of difficulty. But “substantially”
does not require the government to make it impossible for an adherent to exercise his religion—
the burden need not be “complete” or “total.”107
2. Exercise of Religion
Fortunately, Congress has provided a definition of “exercise of religion.” It is a broad one,
as we have seen: “The term ‘religious exercise’ includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.” 108 This definition does not refer to a
person’s religious exercise generally but rather to the particular exercise(s) of religion that make
103

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(a).

104

Burden, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2011).
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Burden, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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Substantially, LEXICO.COM, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/substantially.

Yellowbear v. Lampert, 741 F.3d 48, 55 (10th Cir. 2014) (Gorsuch, J.) (“The term ‘substantial,’ after
all, doesn’t mean complete or total, so a ‘substantial burden’ need not be a complete or total one.”
(internal citations omitted)).
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up a person’s religion. And any exercise of religion within a person’s religious belief system
counts. So the question, as we will see in more detail below,109 is whether the government has
substantially burdened the particular religious exercise at issue in the case.
But courts still have an important role in determining what qualifies as religious exercise.
On the surface, “religious exercise” would seem to protect only religious acts, insofar as exercise
is an active enterprise. Yet the Court has taken a broader reading of “religious exercise” to protect
religious adherents from being forced or encouraged to do what their religion forbids or
discourages.110 This broader reading accords with the tenets of most religions, in which “thou
shalt nots” feature prominently. The Ten Commandments—eight of which are framed in the
negative—are an obvious example.111 Religions often require or encourage fasting and other
forms of abstinence, too. RFRA’s protections would be meager if it failed to cover these forms of
religious exercise.
We should therefore understand RFRA as protecting religious adherents against the
government saying “thou shalt” when his religion says “thou shalt not,” just as it protects religious
adherents against the government saying “thou shalt not” when his religion says “thou shalt.” This
broad reading comports with RLUIPA’s requirement that the statute “be construed in favor of a
broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter

109

See infra subpart III.A.

110

See Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1484 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting from grant of application for
stay) (noting that “[i]n past cases, [the Court has] assessed regulations that compel an activity that a
practitioner’s faith prohibits,” although “some Members of th[e] Court have been reluctant to find that
even a law compelling individuals to engage in conduct condemned by their faith imposes a substantial
burden” (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted)); see also Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of
Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (“[T]he ‘exercise of religion’ often involves not only belief and
profession but the performance of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a
worship service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, abstaining from certain
foods or certain modes of transportation.” (emphasis added)).
111

See Exodus 20:2–17.
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and the Constitution.”112

The Court has read this RLUIPA provision as mandating broad

construction of religious exercise under RFRA as well. 113
3. Restatement
With the help of the definitions above, we can restate the substantial-burden requirement:
the government substantially burdens a person’s religious exercise if it makes it significantly more
difficult for the person to carry out (or avoid carrying out) a particular religious act (or an act
forbidden or discouraged by the person’s religion). A rule can make it financially, practically, or
psychologically more difficult to carry out a particular religious act—the broad wording of
“substantial burden” admits all three types of difficulties.
Why “more difficult”? Because it is already difficult, in the nature of things, for religious
adherents to carry out their religion’s requirements and recommendations.

Temptation and

distractions—TV, sports bars, politics—stand in their way. The question under RFRA is whether
the government has made it significantly more difficult for religious adherents to carry out their
religions’ requirements and recommendations. The government may do so several ways, explored
in the next Part.114 Criminal prohibitions, civil penalties, and other forms of pressure (like that in
Sherbert) may all substantially burden religious exercise.
III.

RELIGIOUS AND SECULAR BURDENS UNDER RFRA

Do substantial burdens imply central beliefs? 115 The first subpart below argues they do
not.116 Questions of religious costs that would result from a person complying with a law have no
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See infra subpart III.A.
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place in a substantial-burden analysis. That leaves the question of secular costs of refusing to
comply with a law. The second subpart considers the four categories of secular burdens on
religious exercise.117 The third and final subpart offers thoughts on how a court should conduct a
substantial-burden analysis.118
A.

Religious Costs (Theological Substantiality)
According to one scholar, RFRA’s substantial-burden test is often seen as entailing two

separate questions: (1) would the religious adherent suffer substantial religious costs by
complying with the challenged law, and (2) would the religious adherent suffer substantial secular
costs by refusing to comply with the challenged law?119 The first question is the focus of this
subpart, which argues, for reasons that should be clear,120 that it is improper for courts to consider
the religious costs a religious adherent would suffer from complying with a challenged law.
The two-part framework nonetheless has many proponents. For example, the Supreme
Court seems to have embraced a version of it in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.121 At issue
in that case was the contraceptive mandate Health and Human Services (HHS) adopted under the
Affordable Care Act.122

The mandate required employers who provide insurance to their

employees to cover certain contraceptives. 123 Hobby Lobby’s owners, the Greens, who believe
that life begins at conception, objected to covering these contraceptives.124 They alleged that the
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See infra subpart III.B.
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contraceptive mandate substantially burdened their religious exercise (and that the government
had no compelling government interest to enforce it against them). Thus, they argued, the mandate
violated RFRA.125 The Court ultimately agreed and struck down the mandate as applied to closely
held corporations like Hobby Lobby. 126
In concluding that the mandate substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ religious exercise, the
Court took into account both the religious and the secular costs the mandate imposed.127 The
mandate imposed religious costs because it demanded that Hobby Lobby’s owners and their stores
“engage in conduct that seriously violates their religious beliefs.”128 It imposed secular costs
because refusing to comply with the mandate would “entail substantial economic
consequences.”129 Refusing to comply meant that Hobby Lobby would have to pay a tax of up to
“$1.3 million per day or about $475 million per year.”130 The Court paired both types of costs in
concluding that the mandate substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ religious exercise: the mandate
met the substantial-burden requirement because it forced the plaintiffs to choose between seriously
violating their religious beliefs and paying a substantial tax.131
The Court took a similar approach to the substantial-burden analysis in Holt v. Hobbs, a
RLUIPA case.132 There, the Court held that an Arkansas Department of Corrections grooming
policy violated RLUIPA as applied to a Muslim prisoner who wanted to grow a ½-inch beard in
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accordance with his religious beliefs.133 As relevant here, the Court concluded that the prisoner
met his burden of proving that the grooming policy substantially burdened his religious exercise. 134
The policy did so by putting the prisoner to a choice: either comply with the policy (which meant
shaving his beard) and seriously violate his religious beliefs (suffering religious costs) or refuse to
comply and “face serious disciplinary action” (suffering secular costs). 135 Thus, in Holt, as in
Hobby Lobby, the Court considered both the religious and the secular costs in its substantial-burden
analysis. But does RFRA (or RLUIPA) allow a court to consider the religious costs of complying
with a law or policy?
This Note proposes that whether RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement allows courts to
consider religious costs (and thus the centrality of a given practice, for we cannot know whether
complying with a law would carry substantial religious costs without knowing whether the practice
is “central” or “significant”) turns on the meaning of “religious exercise.” Religious exercise
could, in the abstract, mean a religious adherent’s exercise of religion generally—i.e., including
all practices and beliefs that make up one’s religion. Or it could mean a particular religious
exercise within one’s religious belief system.
If the first, a centrality inquiry makes sense. The question would be whether the law
substantially burdens the religious adherent’s religious exercise as a whole. Framed this way, a
law that burdens only a minor practice within the adherent’s belief system would not substantially
burden his religious exercise. After all, the law’s impact on his religious exercise (a broad term
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capturing all the dos and don’ts of his religion) would be minor—insubstantial, as far as burdens
go. He would suffer few religious costs.
If the second, a centrality inquiry makes no sense. The only question would be whether
the law substantially burdens the particular religious exercise at issue in the case. Does, say, a
criminal law forbidding the sacramental use of peyote substantially burden that particular religious
practice—the sacramental use of peyote? 136 Framed this way, the particular religious practice is
divorced from the religion as a whole. The remaining question is how the law impacts that
practice. Does the law, for whatever reason, make it significantly more difficult for the religious
adherent to carry out the practice?
The second interpretation is the correct one under RFRA. RFRA covers “any exercise of
religion” within “a system of religious belief.” 137 The particular exercise is singled out, and asking
whether the exercise is compelled by, or central to, a person’s religion is, by definition,
impermissible. That, in turn, means a court must not ask whether the person would suffer religious
costs by complying with a law. To do so would entail analyzing whether a particular religious
exercise is compelled by, or central to, a person’s religion.
Though RFRA’s text is clear, the Supreme Court has not yet addressed how RFRA’s
definition of religious exercise affects the substantial-burden analysis.138 Yet Justice Alito recently
wrote: “[I]t may be that RLUIPA and RFRA do not allow a court to undertake for itself the

See, e.g., Emp. Div., Dep’t of Hum. Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit the application of Oregon drug laws to ceremonial ingestion of
peyote).
136

137

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (emphasis added); id. § 2000bb-2(4).

138

See Murphy v. Collier, 139 S. Ct. 1475, 1484 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting from grant of application for
stay of execution) (“We have not addressed whether, under RLUIPA or its cousin, [RFRA] . . . , there is a
difference between a State’s interference with a religious practice that is compelled and a religious
practice that is merely preferred.”).
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determination of which religious practices are sufficiently mandatory or central to warrant
protection, as both protect ‘any exercise of religion, whether or not compelled by, or central to, a
system of religious belief.’”139 That, indeed, must be the case, and it is due time for the Court to
address the issue. Until then, judges will continue to consider (improperly) the relative importance
of a particular religious exercise to a person’s religion when conducting substantial-burden
analyses.
Justice Kagan seems to have done just that in her concurring opinion in Dunn v. Smith,140
decided last year. There, the Court denied an emergency application to vacate an injunction
prohibiting Willie Smith’s execution without a clergy member in the execution chamber.141 Justice
Kagan concurred, arguing that Alabama’s policy preventing Smith from having a clergy member
in the execution chamber imposed a substantial burden on his exercise of religion. 142 Why?
Because “Smith understands his minister’s presence as ‘integral to [his] faith’ and ‘essential to
[his] spiritual search for redemption.’”143 That may well be true, but the Court should not be asking
how “integral” or “essential” a particular practice is to someone’s faith. Those matters have no
place in a substantial-burden analysis.
Instead, the Court should have asked two questions. First, does having a clergy member
in the execution chamber qualify as religious exercise? Any religious exercise counts, “whether
or not compelled by, or central to,” a person’s religion.144 Assuming, as seems to be true, this was
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a religious exercise, the Court should have moved to the second question: does the policy
substantially burden that particular religious exercise? The answer here must be yes. Smith was
forbidden from having a clergy member in the execution chamber. It was impossible, not just
significantly difficult, for him to carry out the religious practice.145
Justice Kagan’s reasoning in Dunn is similar to the reasoning some circuits employed
before the 2000 amendments to RFRA’s definition of religious exercise. The Tenth and Ninth
Circuits, for instance, applied religious-substantiality tests in pre-2000 RFRA cases. These tests
directed courts to consider whether the practice at issue in a given RFRA case was compelled by,
or central to, the religious adherent’s religion. Take, for example, Werner v. McCotter,146 a Tenth
Circuit case decided before City of Boerne v. Flores.147 Concluding that access to a sweat lodge
and possession of a medicine bag may be sufficiently central to a Native American prisoner’s
religion to trigger RFRA’s protections,148 the Tenth Circuit wrote: “To exceed the ‘substantial
burden’ threshold, government regulation must significantly inhibit or constrain conduct or
expression that manifests some central tenet of a prisoner’s individual beliefs . . . or [among other
things] must deny a prisoner reasonable opportunities to engage in those activities that are
fundamental to a prisoner’s religion.”149
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Of course, that still leaves the question whether the state satisfied strict scrutiny. It may well have.
Justice Kagan thought not. See Dunn, 141 S. Ct. at 725. Justice Kavanaugh, joined by Chief Justice
Roberts, disagreed: “Because the State’s policy . . . serves the State’s compelling interests in ensuring the
safety, security, and solemnity of the execution room, I would have granted the State’s application to
vacate the injunction.” Id. at 726 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting from denial of application to vacate
injunction).
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Thus, in Werner, the test the Tenth Circuit applied required it to consider how central (or
fundamental) the religious act was to a person’s religion. But RFRA’s new definition of religious
exercise bars courts from doing so.150 The question of whether a religious act is central (or
fundamental) to a person’s religion has no place in a substantial-burden analysis.
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Bryant v. Gomez considered whether a prisoner’s religion
compelled the particular religious exercise he alleged the prison substantially burdened.151 The
Ninth Circuit applied a test requiring it to determine whether the plaintiff’s religion mandated the
conduct in question.152 To establish a substantial burden under RFRA, wrote the court, the
religious adherent must “prove that a governmental [action] burdens the adherent’s practice of his
or her religion . . . by preventing him or her from engaging in conduct or having a religious
experience which the faith mandates.” 153 And the prisoner in Bryant failed to prove that his
Pentecostal religion mandated certain practices he sued the prison for failing to provide. 154 The
prison’s policies therefore did not substantially burden the prisoner’s religious exercise, and he
was not entitled to relief. 155
Thus, in Bryant, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a religious adherent’s religion
compelled the acts alleged to be substantially burdened. But RFRA’s new definition of religious
exercise bars courts from doing so.156 The question of whether a religious act is compelled by a
person’s religion has no place in a substantial-burden analysis.
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And yet, despite RFRA’s clear break from cases like Werner and Bryant with the 2000
amendments, some scholars continue to argue that RFRA requires a centrality inquiry. Take, for
example, Professor DeGirolami, who argues that RFRA’s current text requires courts to measure
the substantiality of a burden on religious exercise “against the ‘system of religious belief’ of
which the religious exercise at issue forms a part.” 157 “[A] burden on religious exercise,” he writes,
“is substantial if it interferes in a significant, important, or central way with the claimant’s religious
system.”158 But, again, this must be wrong. RFRA’s text forecloses inquiries into the significance,
importance, or centrality of a religious practice. 159 The statute protects any exercise of religion,
regardless of its place in the person’s “system of religious belief.”160
Granted, Professor DeGirolami rightly recognizes that, by inquiring into centrality (as he
argues courts must do), courts risk entangling themselves in theological matters they should not
be entangled in.161 To address this problem, he argues that “[c]ourts surely ought to defer to
claimants’ understandings of their system of religious belief” and (by implication) the importance
of certain practices within their system of belief.162 Recognizing the same problem, Professor
Gedicks argues that courts should apply neutral principles of law, like common law tort principles,
when conducting a substantial-burden analysis (i.e., one that includes inquiring into religious
costs).163 These are fine ways to help courts avoid resolving theological questions, but they are
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disobeying the law.” Id. at 114. This Note, as should be clear, disagrees.
163

28

unnecessary. Courts should not ask the underlying question about religious costs at all. Given
RFRA’s definition of “religious exercise,” the focus of the substantial-burden requirement should
be secular costs alone.
For the same reason, this Note takes issue with part of the framework for analyzing
substantial burdens Gabrielle M. Girgis proposed in a recent article.164 Her framework requires
courts to ask two questions. First, is this the kind of religious exercise that can be substantially
burdened? And second, does the law impact the person’s religious exercise in a way that
substantially burdens it? 165
Girgis’s formulation of the first step is problematic. She suggests that only two kinds of
religious exercise can be substantially burdened: (1) religious obligations and (2) a broader
category of “non-mandatory but protected religious conduct” she calls “exercises of religious
autonomy.”166 The second group includes “decisions that religion has a natural tendency to
motivate, direct, or organize in the lives of religious believers,” and implicates things like a
religious adherent’s education, profession, and relationships.167 Only substantial exercises of
religious autonomy, she suggests, fall into this second group of religious exercise that can be
substantially burdened.168

Gabrielle M. Girgis, What is a “Substantial Burden” on Religion Under RFRA and the First
Amendment?, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 1755, 1765 (2020).
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Under RFRA,169 however, all kinds of religious exercise can be substantially burdened.
Narrowing the reach of the substantial-burden test to only two kinds of religious exercise is
unnecessary and contrary to the text. Yes, questions remain about what qualifies as religious
exercise under RFRA.

And we can perhaps use Girgis’s second category, encompassing

substantial exercises of religious autonomy, to determine whether something is or is not religious
exercise.170 But the point remains: anything that qualifies as religious exercise is eligible for a
substantial-burden analysis.
B.

Secular Costs (Secular Substantiality)
Judges and scholars have proposed other approaches to determining whether a law

substantially burdens religious exercise. This subpart considers four of them.171 These approaches
focus on the secular costs of complying with the law. In general, they do not run afoul of RFRA’s
bar on inquiring into the centrality of religious beliefs. Nor do they, taken alone, invite judges to
consider the religious costs of complying with a challenged law. To be sure, not all the approaches
are satisfactory if treated as the only way to determine whether a law substantially burdens a
person’s religious exercise, and some (especially the pressure test) are troubling if they are paired
with a centrality inquiry.
1. Punitive (Criminal) Laws

To be fair, Girgis’s article is not narrowly focused on RFRA. She is also anticipating a world without
Smith and giving guidance to courts on how to apply a (constitutionally grounded) substantial-burden test
in that world.
169

Her second category is similar to some mini-RFRAs’ definitions of religious exercise. See, e.g., TEX.
CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 110.001(a)(1) (2021) (“‘Free exercise of religion’ means an act or
refusal to act that is substantially motivated by sincere religious belief.”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-22-2
(2021) (same).
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The most obvious substantial burden a law could impose on a religious adherent is a
criminal penalty for religious exercise. Putting a religious adherent to the choice between
exercising his religion and being convicted of a felony or misdemeanor will almost always
substantially burden the particular exercise of religion—it is pure coercion. All the more so
because most exercises of religion are not one-off acts but rather should be regularly repeated.
The law prohibiting peyote use in Smith would fall into this category.172 Violating such a
law would be a felony offense, carrying significant prison time. 173 In addition, the law prohibiting
bigamy at issue in Reynolds v. United States174 would, by today’s standard, substantially burden
the particular religious practice, namely, bigamy.175 Remember, though, that a religious exemption
from such a law is not a sure thing. The government may well be able to establish that it has a
compelling government interest in uniformly enforcing these laws. It would be difficult, for
example, to overcome Chief Justice Waite’s formulation of the government’s compelling interest
(to use today’s terms) in prohibiting bigamy.176
The more difficult question is whether criminal laws that carry minimal criminal penalties
can substantially burden religious exercise. The Amish parents in Yoder had to pay a $5 fine
(roughly $30 today) for refusing to send their kids to public school.177 Would that be substantial
enough under RFRA? This Note suggests it would be, since the criminal arm of the state would
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be levied against religious adherents who choose to exercise their religion.178 And Yoder itself
supports the idea that even minimal criminal penalties, like the $5 fine, qualify as substantial.
After all, one of RFRA’s purposes was to “restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened.”179
2. Civil Penalties
In a similar vein, Professor Helfand argues that courts should consider whether engaging
in a religious practice will result in civil penalties and how high those penalties are. 180 A steep
penalty for engaging in a religious practice would qualify as a substantial burden, whereas a less
steep penalty would not.181 As with the previous test, the focus here is the penalty, not the religious
practice. The civil-penalty test would therefore protect all religious practices equally, regardless
of their centrality. But laws might burden religious practices differently, imposing high penalties
for engaging in certain practices but lower penalties for engaging in others. Only those practices
the law substantially penalizes would be eligible for a RFRA exemption.182
This approach has two benefits. First, as mentioned, it keeps courts from inquiring into the
centrality of religious beliefs. Second, it is a straightforward test.
But the approach has drawbacks, too. For starters, considering only the magnitude of civil
(or criminal) penalties leaves out many other possible substantial burdens. The government has a

Choosing between being a criminal and following a religion’s requirements or recommendations
should be hard for any law-abiding citizen to bear.
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number of tools at its disposal to pressure or prevent people from exercising their religion. The
next two sections consider these other types of substantial burdens. 183 Suffice it to say here that
considering the magnitude of the penalties for refusing to comply with the law is inadequate if
taken as the only test for determining whether a law substantially burdens a religious exercise.
In addition, this approach could raise line-drawing problems. Some scholars worry that all
civil penalties Congress imposes would count as substantial under Helfand’s approach. For
example, Professor Gedicks notes that “[i]t seems unlikely Congress or a state legislature would
attempt to shape or control general public behavior by laws that may be safely ignored because
violations carries trivial sanctions.”184 He doubts that religiously burdensome laws carrying
insignificant penalties exist. 185 The result (absent a centrality inquiry) would be that all laws that
burden religious exercise by subjecting it to some sort of penalty would count as substantial
burdens.186 And he cannot bear that notion.187
On the other hand, RFRA invites an individualized inquiry into whether a law substantially
burdens a person’s free exercise. Might, then, a given civil penalty burden a low-income religious
adherent more than a middle- or high-income one? Professor DeGirolami raises this issue in the
context of Hobby Lobby.188 He suggests that for an immensely wealthy family (like the Greens)
or a profitable business (like Hobby Lobby), paying $26 million a year (the penalty if Hobby
Lobby had dropped insurance coverage and left their employees to buy insurance on an exchange)
183
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might not rise to the level of a substantial burden.189 To that, we can respond by quoting Justice
Alito: “These sums are surely substantial.”190 That is true regardless of who would have to pay
them.
Finally, emphasizing the limits of the civil-penalty approach, Girgis offers a helpful
hypothetical on communion wine. 191 In the hypothetical, the U.S. government bans consumption
of Bordeaux; one-million dollars is the fine for non-compliance.192 The question is whether this
would qualify as a substantial burden on Catholics, who need some sort of red wine, though not
Bordeaux in particular, for communion.193 Girgis argues that it would qualify as a substantial
burden under Helfand’s formulation of the civil-penalty test; after all, one-million dollars is a
substantial sum.194
Girgis’s conclusion seems to be wrong, and it highlights the importance of framing
“religious exercise” properly. The religious exercise at issue in the hypothetical is drinking any
type of red wine for communion, not drinking Bordeaux specifically. A million-dollar fine for
drinking Bordeaux thus would not substantially burden the religious exercise at issue, assuming
other types of red wine are available. The fine would hardly make it more difficult for Catholics
to carry out communion. Of course, if a group of Catholics insisted (based on sincerely held
religious beliefs) on drinking Bordeaux, the law would substantially burden their religious
exercise. But that is not the case here. The religious exercise could be satisfied by other means,
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without having to pay a million-dollar fine. Whether there are reasonable alternatives therefore
seems to matter a good deal for purposes of a substantial-burden analysis.
The civil-penalty approach thus has many shortcomings. It is partly for that reason this
Note has argued that the driving question should be whether the government has made it
significantly more difficult for a person to carry out (or avoid carrying out) a particular religious
act (or an act forbidden or discouraged by the person’s religion). Incurring a financial penalty for
engaging in a particular religious exercise will often meet this standard. Having to choose between
paying large sums of money to the government and abiding by one’s religion is a difficult choice
to make, including for wealthy individuals and for-profit businesses.
3. Substantial Pressure
Next is the broader pressure test, which encompasses, but extends beyond, the two tests
mentioned above. Sherbert v. Verner originated this type of test, though it has many iterations.195
Ms. Sherbert was not subject to any civil fine for not working on Saturdays. 196 Her burden was of
a different nature: she had to choose between observing the Sabbath (in which case she could
neither work nor receive unemployment benefits) or abandoning the Sabbath to find work.197 This
choice put substantial pressure on her to abandon her practice of observing the Sabbath.
The pressure test captures more than situations like Sherbert, where a public benefit is on
the line.198 Forcing a person to choose between exercising his religion and suffering a criminal or
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For a scholar’s endorsement of the pressure test, see Chad Flanders, Insubstantial Burdens, in
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civil penalty may also impose substantial pressure on his religious exercise, thus encompassing
the two categories above. So too may losing some other sort of benefit or being put at a competitive
disadvantage. Some, for example, think that the Pennsylvania statute in Braunfeld v. Brown 199
requiring all business to close on Sunday substantially burdened the Saturday-Sabbath-observing
Jewish business owners’ religious exercise. As Girgis puts it, this statute pressured “Jewish
business owners into a trilemma: they must choose between giving up an exercise of substantial
religious autonomy (by giving up running a business in accordance with their belief that the
Sabbath falls on Saturday), a fine for non-compliance (by opening on Sunday), or surrendering
their ability to run a business on equal or competitive terms (by closing on Saturday and
Sunday).”200 But the Braunfeld Court upheld the statute, albeit before Sherbert changed the Free
Exercise landscape (until Smith).201
The substantial-pressure test is perhaps the easiest to grasp conceptually. The difficulty
with it, as with other tests, lies in deciding when the pressure is significant enough to qualify as a
substantial burden. The question becomes one of magnitude, but cases like Sherbert can help
guide courts to the right decision.
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Braunfeld, 366 U.S. at 609. Explaining why it thought the statute should survive a Free Exercise
challenge, the Court wrote:
[T]he statute at bar does not make unlawful any religious practices of appellants; the
Sunday law simply regulates a secular activity and, as applied to appellants, operates so
as to make the practice of their religious beliefs more expensive. Furthermore, the law’s
effect does not inconvenience all members of the Orthodox Jewish faith but only those
who believe it necessary to work on Sunday. And even these are not faced with as serious
a choice as forsaking their religious practices or subjecting themselves to criminal
prosecution.
Id. at 605 (footnote omitted).
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Another possible difficulty arises when the pressure test is paired with a centrality inquiry.
This Note has argued that judges should avoid centrality inquiries altogether. The pressure test
demonstrates the importance of doing so. Imagine a court, in conducting a substantial-burden
inquiry, first asks whether a religious exercise is central to (or compelled by) a person’s religion,
then asks whether the law pressures that person to abandon the religious exercise. Proceeding as
this hypothetical court does could lead to anomalous results. As a psychological matter, a religious
adherent will feel far more pressure to abandon a religious practice if it is not central to (or
compelled by) their religion than he would if it is central. So a (hypothetical, whacky) court might
conclude the law in question substantially burdened the adherent’s religious exercise because the
religious exercise was not central to their religion. But surely RFRA does not treat less-important
religious practices more favorably than more-important ones. By avoiding a centrality inquiry
altogether, no anomalies of this nature result. All religious exercises are treated equally.
4. Preclusive Burdens
This final category—preclusive burdens 202—includes many types of substantial burdens
that do not fit in the other three categories. These burdens arise when religious adherents cannot
undertake their religious exercise under any circumstances because of a law or policy.203 Where
there is a preclusive burden, religious adherents are left choiceless—there is no option to violate
the law and suffer a criminal or civil penalty, as things stand.
Though these burdens do not necessarily carry secular costs, the existence of a substantial
burden is indisputable under the restatement offered in Part II.204 They are most common in the

Girgis calls these types of burdens “preventive burdens,” see Girgis, supra note 164, at 1774, but this
Note prefers “preclusive burdens.”
202

203

Id.

204

See supra section II.C.3.

37

RLUIPA cases. Willie Dunn, for example, could not, of his own accord, invite a clergy member
into the execution chamber. In a case like Dunn, as well as cases concerning religious-diet
accommodations, the decision-making power lies elsewhere. 205 Until the decision-maker changes
the policy (or agrees to an accommodation), religious adherents will be precluded from engaging
in the particular religious exercise.
Girgis argues that Lyng also falls into this category.206 By destroying sacred land, she
argues, the government prevented the American Indians from exercising their religion. 207
Professor Flanders agrees. Though he stresses the importance of the land to the American Indians
in a way this Note would not (for purposes of an RFRA analysis), he captures the idea of preclusive
burdens nicely: “There is no reason to think that a law burdens religion any less when it makes the
exercise of religion impossible than when it compels action or inaction inconsistent with religious
commitment.”208 Indeed, though we might need to consider how RFRA’s substantial-burden
requirement interacts with pre-RFRA cases like Bowen and Lyng (in which the Court concluded
the government had not substantially burdened the plaintiffs’ religious exercise),209 Lyng seems to
fit squarely within the definition of substantial burden this Note arrived at earlier. 210 Destroying
the sacred land would make it significantly more difficult—impossible, really—to carry out
specific religious acts associated with the land.
C.

Brief Thoughts on the Proper Test
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In conducting a substantial-burden analysis, a court should ask two questions. The first is
whether something qualifies as a religious exercise for purposes of RFRA.211 The second is
whether the plaintiff has met his burden212 of proving that the challenged rule substantially burdens
that particular religious exercise. But the second question should not involve any analysis of the
centrality or importance of the religious exercise to the plaintiff’s religion as a whole. The focus
must be secular, not religious, costs. The tests from the previous subpart can help the court
determine whether a rule substantially burdens the particular religious exercise. 213 They are not
the only tests but rather helpful guides. The driving question should be whether the government
has made it significantly more difficult for a person to carry out (or avoid carrying out) a particular
religious act (or an act forbidden or discouraged by the person’s religion).
Conducting this inquiry requires judges to exercise their judgment. They will have to
determine whether the civil penalty or other pressure a law imposes is substantial enough.
Unfortunate, perhaps, but RFRA’s substantial-burden requirement admits of few bright-line rules.
Could that have been part of the motivation behind Justice Scalia’s decision in Smith? RFRA’s
substantial-burden test, though unique in that it is not judge-made, is susceptible to many of the
same criticisms as the undue-burden test in the abortion context. 214
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IV. CONCLUSION
What exactly the substantial-burden requirement is remains somewhat unclear. But we
know what it is not. It is not an invitation for judges to inquire into the centrality of a particular
religious exercise to a person’s religion. Such an inquiry is, after all, impermissible.
And yet we can expect courts to continue considering how central or significant a particular
religious exercise is to a person’s religion when conducting substantial-burden analyses. The
reason is simple. Incorporating centrality into substantial-burden analyses makes the argument
against the government more compelling. It is intuitively more unjust for the government to
prevent someone from engaging in religious exercise that is central to, or compelled by, their
religion—and readers, whether of a legal brief or a judicial opinion, will recognize as much. That
is why Willie Smith’s lawyers emphasized in their briefs how “integral” and “essential” having a
minister in the execution chamber was to Smith’s religion. It is also why Justice Kagan quoted
these statements in her concurrence.215

district judges to apply an ‘undue burden’ standard as doubtful in application as it is unprincipled in
origin”).
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